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A MODEL OF CULTURAL EVOLUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF
STRATEGIC CONFLICT
MISHA PEREPELITSA
ABSTRACT. We consider a model of cultural evolution for a strategy
selection in a population of individuals who interact in a game theoretic
framework. The evolution combines individual learning of the environ-
ment (population strategy profile), reproduction, proportional to the suc-
cess of the acquired knowledge, and social transmission of the knowl-
edge to the next generation. A mean-field type equation is derived that
describes the dynamics of the distribution of cultural traits, in terms of
the rate of learning, the reproduction rate and population size. We es-
tablish global well-posedness of the initial-boundary value problem for
this equation and give several examples that illustrate the process of the
cultural evolution for some classical games.
1. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory, pioneered by Maynard Smith and Price [16] is
a powerful tool that explains dominance of some behavioral traits as being
uninvadable by other traits in the competition for Darwinian fitness points,
when fitness is frequency dependent. A deterministic dynamic process that
selects a stable behavioral traits can be described by the replicator equation,
see Taylor and Jonker [17], Hofbauer et al. [7], Zeeman [18].
The replicator equation also governs the dynamics of reinforcement learn-
ing in repeated play of a game, see Borgers and Sarin [1], Fudenberg and
Levine [3], Krishnedu et al. [10], Perepelitsa [11].
Learning in games is an integral part of game theory that goes back to
works of Robinson [13] and Shapley [14]. One of its mainstays is fictitious
play or statistical learning. The learning by fictitious play in large pop-
ulations can be described by an ODE, called best-response equation, see
Gilboa and Matsui [5], Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer [4], Hofbauer [6] and
Hofbauer and Sigmund[8]. The best-response equation describes changes
in the mean statistical prior about the opponent actions, and its stationary
points are Nash equilibria.
In this paper we consider an evolutionary process that combines the con-
cept of “the survival of fittest” from biological evolution with individual
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learning through fictitious play, when a state of learning is socially trans-
mitted to the next generation of players. The examples of this types of
processes are furnished by the cultural evolution theory.
Consider a cartoonish scenario of cultural evolution. Lets say there is
an island populated by pedantical statisticians capable of asexual reproduc-
tion. Statisticians wonder aimlessly around an island, meeting each other
occasionally for a round of a game (symmetric game with a finite set of
strategies). Each carries a ledger where he/she carefully marks how many
times the opponent played a particular strategy (opponents as indistinguish-
able). To select a strategy, each of them uses the “sacred book of rules”
(best response in a game) that prescribes what to do given the current count
from his/her ledger. The book has a dual purpose of settling the outcome of
each play of the game (payoffs), and the players collect certain amount of
fitness points from each play. From time to time statisticians reproduce at
the rate proportional to their accumulated fitness. When that happens, they
solemnly pass an exact copy of their ledgers to each of the offspring, who
carry on with it in the same manner.
We say that this model is a form of cultural evolution because it is char-
acterized by social transmission of traits (inheritance of knowledge) and
individual learning as adaptation mechanisms, see Hoppitt and Laland [9],
Richerson and Boyd [12]. Note, that in this case, social transmission and
learning change population strategy profile (environment), which determines,
in its turn, the degree of success of a cultural trait, rendering the problem
nonlinear.
The main parameters of the problem are the rate of learning, the rate of
reproduction and population size. Additional information might be needed
to completely specify the problem. For example, if the island is not big,
we may assume that the frequency with which inhabitants meet and play
the game increases with the population size. Another scenario is an infinite
island which allows inhabitants to spread, no matter how many of them are
there, so that the interaction frequency is constant.
The goal of the paper is to develop a mathematical model that takes as
input the initial distribution of cultural traits in a population, the above men-
tioned rates of learning and reproduction, and outputs the distribution of
cultural traits at any moment t in future. As we will see from the exam-
ples of section 3, it is essential for an accurate description of the dynamics
that the model specifies the whole distribution of traits and not just some
statistical averages, such as the mean and the variance. The model is de-
rived as a mean-field approximation of the distribution density of a Markov
process describing the interaction of agents. The equation is of kinetic type
with non-linear kinetic velocities. Due to the discontinuities of the best-
response function, solutions of this equation are intrinsically weak. Our
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main result, stated in section 2, establishes global well-posedeness of the
initial-boundary value problem for this equation.
In section 3 we discuss two examples that illustrate the dynamics of this
model of cultural evolution. In the first, we consider Hawk-Dove-Retaliator
game with two evolutionary stable strategies: 12H+
1
2D and R. These two
strategies are the only asymptotically stable points for the replicator and
best-response equations. The phase, however, are different, with the basin
of attraction for 12H+
1
2D, for the replicator equation, being strictly included
in the basin of attraction for the best-response dynamics. As a result, there
are initial conditions for the distribution of cultural traits which evolve to
Retaliator when the rate of learning is low, but proceed to 12H+
1
2D when
learning rate is increased. It also means that if the biological evolution pro-
ceeds to the mix of Hawk and Dove, it can not be averted to anything else
by learning. Another interesting property of this process is a sharp change
in the environment (population strategy profile) when a subpopulation con-
tinuously transitions from one decision polygon to another.
In the second example, of Rock-Paper-Scissors game, we show how ex-
ponentially growing heterogeneous population can lock the cultural evolu-
tion in a suboptimal pure strategy, in contrast to both, the dynamics of the
replicator and best-response equations.
In general, determining asymptotic state for this type of evolution for an
arbitrary game is problematic due to complicated dynamics and absence
of entropy functionals. It can be done in some cases, at least partially, as
in the model with zero reproduction rate. For that model, we show that if
two statistical averages, the mean prior and mean best-response converge to
some values (not necessarily the same), then the prior of every agent in the
population converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game.
2. MODEL
We consider a series of plays of a symmetric 2-player game between
randomly selected agents in a large population. There are d strategies avail-
able to agents and the payoffs are given by matrix A = {ai j}di, j=1, which
we assume to have non-negative entries. The game defines multi-valued
best response function BR(p) : Sd−1 → P(Sd−1), where Sd−1 is d − 1
dimensional simplex. We will also use its single valued representative
b(p) ∈ BR(p/∑i pi). We refer the reader to Appendix section 4.1 for de-
tails. We start with the case when there is no reproduction and the popula-
tion stays at the same level N.
We will record the change of the state of agents that occur at discrete
epochs, labeled by t. The state of agent i at epoch t is a d+ 1 dimensional
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vector
X ti =
(
Pti ,S
t
i
)
,
where
Pti = (p
t
i,1, ..., p
t
i,d),
is a vector of learning priors (unscaled) and Sti is an averaged, accumulated
fitness.
An interaction is a round of the game between to random agents, say
i and j, who play according to their priors Pti and P
t
j , that is, using their
best response strategies. Based on that, they earn fitness points and update
the learning priors. To describe the update rule we will use the following
parameters: h – the characteristic learning increment, µh – characteristic
fitness increment, and δ – time increment. Thus we assuming the learning
and fitness increments are of the same order, but not necessarily equal. The
rule takes the form
Pt+δi = P
t
i +hb(P
t
j)
Pt+δj = P
t
j+hb(P
t
i )
St+δi = (1−µh)Sti+µha(b(Pti ),b(Ptj))
St+δj = (1−µh)Stj+µha(b(Ptj),b(Pti ))
where a(b(Pti ),b(P
t
j)) = ∑k,l ai jb(P
t
i,k)b(P
t
j,l) is the fitness earned by agent
i. In this formulas the fitness is averaged over the history of payoffs, so that
it can not grow without a bound. One can think of µ as being a recency
parameter. Large values of µ put more weight on more recent payoffs.
Our goal here is to derive an approximate equation for f (p,s, t) – the
density of the distribution of agents over the space of learning priors and
fitness (p,s) ∈Rd+×R+. In the following derivation we use the convention
that
xi = (pi,si), x¯= (x1, ...,xN) ∈ (Rd+×R+)N ,
where x¯ parametrized the state of the whole population.
Let w(x¯, t) be the density of the distribution of priors and fitness for the
whole population. This function implicitly depends on parameters such
as h1,h2, and µ, but we suppress them from notation for convenience of
presentation. The update rule can be expressed as a moment relation with a
test function φ ,∫
φ(x¯)w(x¯, t+δ )dx¯= ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫
φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=xˆi
x j=xˆ j
w(x¯, t)dx¯,
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where xˆi = (pi+ hb(p j), (1− µh)si+ µha(b(pi),b(p j))), ans symmetri-
cally for xˆ j. The last equation can be written as
(1)∫
φ(x¯)[w(x¯, t+δ )−w(x¯, t)]dx¯= ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫
[φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=xˆi
x j=xˆ j
−φ(x¯)]w(x¯, t)dx¯.
Function f (x, t), where x= (p,s) is related to the multi-agent distribution
w(x¯, t) through the rule:
f (x, t) = ∑
k
N−1
∫
w(x¯)
∣∣
xk=x
dx¯k, x ∈ Rd+×R+,
where x¯k is a (d+1)(N−1) dimensional vector of all coordinates, x1, ...,xN ,
excluding xk. This is one-particle distribution function. In the formulas to
follow we need to use two-particle distribution function
g(x,y, t) = ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫
w(x¯)
∣∣
xi=x,x j=y
dx¯i j,
where x¯i j is the (d+ 1)(N− 2) dimensional vector of all coordinated ex-
cluding xi and x j.
Function g is symmetric in (x,y) and is related to f by the formulas
f (x, t) =
∫
g(x,y, t)dx=
∫
g(x,y, t)dy.
The moments of function f and g are computed from the moments of w :
∫
ψ(x) f (x, t)dx= ∑
k
N−1
∫
ψ(xk)w(x¯)dx¯,
and
∫
ω(x,y)g(x,y, t)dxdy= ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫
ω(xi,x j)w(x¯)dx¯.
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Now, we use (1) to obtain an integral equation of the change of function f .
For that select φ(x¯) = ψ(xk), sum over k and take average. We get
(2)
∫
ψ(x)[ f (x, t+δ )− f (x, t)]dx
= N−1∑
k
∑
i6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫
[ψ(xk)
∣∣∣ xi=xˆi
x j=xˆ j
−ψ(xk)]w(x¯, t)dx¯
= N−1∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
(∫
[ψ(xˆi)−ψ(xi)]w(x¯, t)dx¯
+
∫
[ψ(xˆ j)−ψ(x j)]w(x¯, t)dx¯
)
=
2
N
∫∫
[ψ(xˆ)−ψ(x)]g(x,y, t)dxdy,
where x= (p,s), y= (p′,s′) and
xˆ= (p+hb(p′), (1−µh)s+µha(b(p),b(p′))).
To proceed to, we make an assumption of statistical independence of the
states of two randomly selected agents:
g(x,y, t) = f (x, t) f (y, t).
The plausibility of this condition is partially justified if the population is
large, so that same agents are rarely matched together, and the information
about the interaction is not shared between other agents.
Then, expanding ψ(xˆ) in Taylor series and integrating by parts, we obtain
(3)
∫
ψ(x)[ f (x, t+δ )− f (x, t)]dx
=
2
N
∫∫
ψ(p,s)divp,s
(
(hb(p′),µhs−µha(b(p),b(p′))) f (x, t)) f (y, t)dydx
+O(h2)
=
2
N
∫
ψ(p,s)divp,s
(
(hb¯(t),µhs−µha¯(b(p), t)) f (x, t)) dx
+O(h2),
with the mean best response
(4) b¯(t) =
∫∫
b(p) f (p,s, t)dpds,
and the mean fitness for using strategy b(p) :
(5) a¯(b(p), t) =
∫∫
a(b(p),b(p′)) f (p′,s′, t)dp′ds′ = ∑
i, j
ai jbi(p)b¯ j(t).
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Dividing equation by δ and ignoring higher order terms we arrive at Fokker-
Planck equation for density f (p,s, t) :
(6) ∂t f +
2h
Nδ
divp
(
b¯(t) f
)
+
2hµ
Nδ
∂s ((a¯(b(p), t)− s) f ) = 0.
In passing from a discrete to continuous time model we are assuming δ ,h
are small, N is large, so that ratios
(7) αp =
2h
Nδ
, αs =
2µh
Nδ
are of finite order. Note that (Nδ )−1 can be interpreted as a number of
interactions per agent, per unit of time. We’re assuming that this number
is large and inversely proportional to the characteristic learning and fitness
increment h.
Now we extend the model to variable populations, by allowing agents to
reproduce at the rate proportional their level of fitness. At this point we
proceeding heuristically, leaving out the details of the derivation.
With reproduction, the Fokker-Planck equation must be appended by a
source term proportional to (s− r¯(t)) f (p,s, t) on the right-hand side of (6),
where r¯(t) is mean population fitness
(8) r¯(t) = ∑
i, j
ai jb¯i(t)b¯ j(t).
Mean population size N = N(t), which is determined from the equation
(9)
1
N
dN
dt
= α
∫∫
s f (p,s, t)dpds,
where α is reproduction rate. Moreover rates αp, αs are variable and depend
on N = N(t). The final model reads:
(10) ∂t f +αpdivp
(
b¯(t) f
)
+αs∂s ((a¯(b(p), t)− s) f ) = α(s− r¯(t)) f ,
with αp,αs, b¯(t), a¯(b(p), t) and r¯(t) given by (7), (15), (5), and (8), respec-
tively. Note that equations (9) and (10) are coupled through formulas (7).
2.1. Singular limit of recency parameter µ.. In the reproduction scenario
described by (10), children acquire not only knowledge p of parents but also
their averaged, accumulated fitness s. Hypothetically, this might be a valid
assumption in some situations, however, it seems more relevant to consider
the case that it is only knowledge p that eventually determines the fitness of
offspring. This can easily be achieved in the framework of models (7)-(10)
be taking the limit of µ → ∞ (αs → ∞), which overweights the stimulus
obtained from recent encounters. For the derivation of the new model we
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proceed informally. Dividing equation (10) by αs and passing to the limit,
we get
∂s((a¯(b(p), t)− s) f ) = 0.
Since f is non-negative, this equation can be true only if for all p∈Rd+, and
t > 0, f is a delta-function concentrated on value a¯(b(p), t) :
f (p,s, t) = δ (s− a¯(b(p), t)).
That is, fitness equals to the expected payoff for an agent using strategy
b(p) against the population strategy profile b¯(t):
s= a¯(b(p), t) = ∑
i j
ai jbi(p)b¯ j(t).
Now, the dimension of the problem can be reduced, as we can integrate (10)
in s, and find an equation for moment
∫ ∞
−∞ f (p,s, t)ds, which, with slight
abuse of notation, we still call f (p, t). The equation reads:
∂t f +αpdivpb¯(t) f = α(a¯(b(p), t)− r¯(t)) f
= α
(
∑
i j
ai jbi(p)b¯ j(t)−∑
i j
ai jb¯i(t)b¯ j(t)
)
f .(11)
This is the equation of our main interest, for which we will establish global
well-posedness. Before we switch to the mathematical analysis, we mention
a special case with zero reproduction α = 0.
To complete the mathematical setup for equations (11) and (14) it re-
mains to add the initial conditions for the population size N(0) = N0, for
the density
(12) f (p,0) = f0(p), p ∈ Rd+.
and boundary conditions (zero influx of probability):
(13) f (p, t) = 0, p ∈ ∂Rd+, t ≥ 0.
Note that velocity vector b¯(t) is always directed into Rd+, and the problem
is not over-determined.
2.2. Fictitious play in large populations. The model becomes particu-
larly simple:
(14) ∂t f +αpdiv(b¯(t) f ) = 0,
with the mean best response
(15) b¯(t) =
∫
b(p) f (p, t)dp.
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Using equation (14) we can compute the equation for the mean empirical
frequencies vector P(t) :
(16)
dPi
dt
=
∫ 1
∑ j p j
(
b¯i(t)− pi∑ j p j
)
f˜ (p, t)dp, i= 1..d,
since ∑ j b¯ j(t) = 1. If one postulates that all agents have the same, or ap-
proximately the same, priors
(17) p(t) = (P1(t), ..,Pd(t)),
then the above equation reduces to a variant of the best response dynamics
equation:
(18)
dPi
dt
=
1
∑ jPj(t)
(
b¯i(P)−Pi
)
, i= 1..d.
Notice, also, the positive factor on the right-hand side of the equation. For
a learning processes in which priors become large, the learning rate slows
down.
2.3. Relation to the replicator equation. With zero learning rate αp = 0
model (11) is simply the replicator equation written in terms of the distri-
bution function f (p, t). Indeed, in this case each agent uses a fixed strategy
b(p), so that the population is split into at most d groups, each using a
particular strategy, and each reproducing at the rate proportional to the av-
eraged fitness obtained from interacting with whole population. Formally,
one obtains the system of replicator equations by integrating (11) over sets
{p : b(p) = ek}, k = 1..d.
2.4. Existence of weak solutions. In this section we establish our main
result, theorem 1. Let Ω = Rd+, and C10(Ω) be a space of continuously
differentiable functions with compact support in Ω . We adopt standard no-
tation for Lp(Ω) spaces and the space of functions of locally bounded vari-
ation BVloc(Ω). The latter consists of all measurable and locally integrable
functions f such that for any ball Br,
‖ f‖TV (Br∩Ω)= sup
{∫
Br∩Ω
fdivψ dp : ψ ∈C10(Br∩Ω), sup
p
|ψ| ≤ 1
}
<+∞.
For such functions, the distributional derivative ∂pi f , i = 1..d, is a signed
Radon measure. One can find the information on these spaces and the re-
sults from functional analysis that we use below, for example, in a book by
Brezis [2].
Theorem 1. Let f0 ∈ C10(Ω) be a non-negative function with unit mass.
There is a unique weak solution f of (11), (12), (13) such that
f ∈C([0,T ];L1(Ω))∩L∞([0,T ];BV (Br∩Ω)), ∀r,T > 0.
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For any t > 0, f (p, t)≥ 0, a.e. in Ω and ∫ f (p, t)dp= 1.
Proof. From the definition of function b(p) and properties of BR(p) it fol-
lows that for any ball Br, b(p) has finite total variation on Br∩Ω , and there
is C =C(r), but not depending on the center of the ball, such that
(19) ‖b‖TV (Br∩Ω) ≤C.
Equation (11) can be written in non-conservative form as
(20) ∂t f + b¯(t)∇ f =
(
∑ai j(bi(p)b¯ j(t)− b¯i(t)b¯ j(t))
)
f ,
where for simplicity we set α = 1. Given a continuous function b¯(t) we
solve this equation by the method of characteristics. For a mapping X t :
Rd → Rd, defined as
X t(p) = p+
∫ t
0
b¯(τ)dτ,
f is expressed through the formula
f (X t(p), t) = f0(p)exp
{∫ t
0
∑ai j[bi(Xτ(p))b¯ j(τ)− b¯i(τ)b¯ j(τ)]dτ
}
,
or as
(21) f (p, t) = f0(p−
∫ t
0
b¯(τ)dτ)
× exp
{∫ t
0
∑ai j[bi(p−
∫ t
τ
b¯i(s)ds)b¯ j(τ)− b¯i(τ)b¯ j(τ)]dτ
}
.
Let g ∈ C([0,T ];L1(Ω)) be a non-negative function such that g(p,0) =
f0(p), and
∫
g(p, t)dp= 1, for all t ∈ [0,T ]. We denote this subset of func-
tions as K. It is a closed, convex subset of C([0,T ];L1(Ω)). Let
b¯g(t) =
∫
b(p)g(p, t)dp,
and define map f =L (g) by evaluating (21) with b¯ = b¯g. Notice that due
to assumptions on g, supt |b¯g(t)| ≤ 1. It follows that
sup
p,t
f (p, t)≤ eCT sup
p
f0(p),
for some C > 0 independent of g, and
∫
f (p, t)dp = 1. Moreover, the fol-
lowing lemma holds
Lemma 1. For any r > 0, f ∈ L∞((0,T );BV (Br ∩Ω)), and there is C =
C(r,T ), independent of g such that
ess supt‖ f (·, t)‖TV (BR∩Ω) ≤C(r,T ).
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Proof. Recall that b(p) is a function of finite total variation that verifies
estimate (19). Differentiating (21) in pk, and using the chain rule we find
that for any ball Br,
(22)
∫
Br
|∂pk f |dp≤C(T )
∫
Ω
|∂pk f0|dp
+C(T )sup f0
∫ t
0
∫
Br−
∫ t
τ b¯g(s)ds
∑
i
|∂pkbi(p)|dpdτ
≤C(T )
∫
Ω
|∂pk f0|dp+C(r,T )sup f0 ≤C(r,T ),
where |∂pkbi(p)| is a Borel measure. 
Using the argument of the last lemma one easily verifies that f is Lips-
chitz continuous in time with values in L1(Ω) :
Lemma 2. Let t and t+ δ ∈ [0,T ]. Then, there is C =C(T ), independent
of g, such that
(23)
∫
| f (p, t+δ )− f (p, t)|dp≤ ‖ f0‖C1(Ω)Cδ .
From the properties of f = L (g) that we have just established we see
thatL maps K into itself. In addition, we now show that
Lemma 3. L [K] is pre-compact in C([0,T ];L1(Ω)).
Proof. Indeed, since f has bounded total variation in p, we know that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫
| f (p+h, t)− f (p, t)|dp≤C(T )h.
The support of functions f (·, t) for all different t’s and g’s is contained
in some fixed ball Br because X t is an uniform translation with a con-
tinuous vector
∫ t
0 b¯g(τ)dτ. By Kolmogorov-Riesz-Frechet theorem, for all
t ∈ [0,T ], set
{L (g)}g∈K
is pre-compact in L1(Ω). Using Lipschitz continuity in time, this also im-
plies that {L }g∈K is pre-compact in C([0,T ];L1(Ω)). 
Thus, L is a compact mapping from K into itself. By Schauder fixed
point theorem, there is a fixed point f = L ( f ) in K ⊂ C([0,T ];L1(Ω)).
Clearly, it verifies all estimates that we have derived. Moreover, it can be
shown that f is a weak solution of pde (11).
Uniqueness of solutions follows from a stronger property, stability esti-
mate. Let f1, f2 be two solutions of (11)–(13) with initial conditions f0,1
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and f0,2. Such solutions verify the formula (21), from which we find that∫
| f1(p, t)− f2(p, t)|dp≤C(T )
∫
| f0,1(p, t)− f0,2(p, t)|dp
+C
∫ t
0
∫
| f1(p,τ)− f2(p,τ)|dpdτ.
Thus, according to Gronwall’s inequality∫
| f1(p, t)− f2(p, t)|dp≤C(T )
∫
| f0,1(p, t)− f0,2(p, t)|dp.

Now we collect information on the support of solutions of (11) that will
be used in the proof of theorem 2.
Lemma 4. Suppose that supp f0 ⊂ Interior(Ω). Then, for any t > 0,
a. supp f (·, t)⊂ Interior(Ω);
b. for any p ∈Ω ,
|p+
∫ t
0
b¯(τ)dτ| ≥ t/d2;
c. if supp f0 ⊂ Br(p0), for some r and p0 ∈Ω , then
supp f (·, t)⊂ Br
(
p0+
∫ t
0
b¯(τ)dτ
)
.
Proof. Since for any t, b¯(t) ∈ Sd−1 ⊂ Ω and Ω is a cone, it follows that∫ t
0 b¯(τ)dτ ∈Ω and for any p ∈ Interior(Ω), p+
∫ t
0 b¯(τ)dτ ∈ Interior(Ω).
Moreover, the distance from p+
∫ t
0 b¯(τ),dτ to ∂Ω is no less than the dis-
tance from p to ∂Ω . This proves part. a. Part b. follows from the fact that
for any t > 0, ∑di=1 b¯i(t) = 1, and so, there is i0, and there is δ0 ⊂ [0, t], such
that b¯i0(t)≥ 1/d, for all t ∈ ∆0, and |∆0| ≥ t/d. Part c. follows immediately
from (21). 
2.5. Asymptotic behavior in fictitious play. Consider a model of statis-
tical learning in a large population described by equation (14). An initial
boundary-value problem (12), (13) with arbitrary f0 ∈C10(Ω), has a global
unique solution, as was established in theorem 1. Denote population mean
learning prior by
P(t) =
∫ p
∑i pi
f (p, t)dp,
and by fˆ the projection of f (p, t) onto the simplex Sd−1. That is,
fˆ (pˆ, t) = f (p, t), pˆ=
p
∑i pi
∈ Sd−1.
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Hawk Dove Retaliator
Hawk -1 2 -1
Dove 0 1 0.9
Retaliator -1 1.1 1
TABLE 1. Hawk-Dove-Retaliator game.
The next theorem shows that if the population averages P(t) and b¯(t) con-
verge to certain values, then these values must be the same and equal to
a Nash equilibrium for the matrix game, and the learning priors of every
agent in the population converge to that Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Suppose that limt→∞P(t) = P0 and limt→∞ b¯(t) = b0. Then,
b0 = P0 ∈ BR(P0),
and ∀ε > 0, ∃T (ε) such that if t > T (ε), then
(24) supp fˆ (·, t)⊂ Bε(P0)∩Sd−1.
Proof. Consider function fˆ (p, t) which is defined for p ∈ Sd−1. From the
definition of P(t) it follows that P(t) belongs to the closed convex hull
spanned by supp fˆ (·, t). At time t = 0, the support of f0 is separated from
the origin, and thus, by properties b. and c. of lemma 4 (it applies to solu-
tions of (14) as well), support of f (·, t) will be contained in a ball of fixed
radius and the center diverging to infinity. This means that the diameter of
the support of projection fˆ decreases to zero. At the same time, since it
contains point P(t) accumulating at P0, statement (24) follows.
To proof the first statement, notice that for sufficiently small ε and large t,
all of mass of fˆ is near P0 so that b¯(t) is a convex combination of values of of
BR(p) in polytops adjacent to point P0, and so (see (29) from Appendinx),
is an element of BR(P0). On the other hand P0 must be equal to b0, because
of the transport structure of the kinetic equation (14). 
3. EXAMPLES
3.1. Cultural evolution in Hawk-Dove-Retaliator game. Consider a clas-
sical Hawk-Dove-Retaliator game, table 1, from evolutionary game theory,
see Maynard Smith [15] ans Zeeman [18], table 1. The game has two ESS:
1
2Hawk+
1
2Dove and Retaliator. Depending on the initial distribution of fre-
quencies to play hawk, dove, or retaliator, the replicator dynamics will pro-
ceed to one of ESS’s as shown on figure 1.
The same strategies are also asymptotically stable points for the best-
response dynamics, which describes the statistical learning (fictitious play)
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in this game. Figure 1 shows the basins of attraction for each of the strate-
gies. Notice that basin of attraction for strategy R in replicator equation
contains that region for the best-response dynamics. The mismatch be-
tween two dynamics accounts for different scenarios of cultural learning
for different pairs of the learning and reproduction rates (αp,α).
For a population consisting of three groups, located in three best-respnse
poligyons, figures 2 and 3 show two different scenarios for cultural evolu-
tion. The first is reproduction dominated and the other is learning dominated
dynamics. Trajectories were obtained by solving (11) numerically.
Notice also that the mean best-response (strategy profile) changes dis-
continuously when one the subpopulation crosses the boundaries of best
response polygons.
With finite number of subpopulations the model reduces to a system of
ODEs. In this particular example the density function
f (p, t) =
3
∑
i=1
wi(t)δ (p− pi(t)),
3
∑
i=1
wi(t) = 1.
where functions pi and wi are solutions of
∂t pi = b¯(t), i= 1..3,
∂twi = αwi
(
∑
kl
aklbk(pi(t))b¯l(t)−akl b¯k(t)b¯l(t)
)
, i= 1..3,
and
b¯(t) = w1(t)b(p1(t))+w2(t)b(p2(t))+w3(t)b(p3(t)).
Notice that all priors pi(t) change in the direction of the mean best response
b¯(t) (when projected to Sd−1, this means that pi(t) moves toward b¯(t)), and
the weights wi change according the performance of priors pi.
Figures 2 and 3 were obtained using the following set of initial data:
w1(0) = 0.3, w2(0) = 0.2, w3(0) = 0.5, p1(0) = (0.1,0.8,0.1), p2(0) =
(0.7,0.2,0.1), p3(0) = (0.05,0.25,0.7). With such initial data, the mean
best response b¯(0) = (0.3,0.2,0.5) is located in the basin of attraction of
Retaliator according to the replicator equation and in the basin of attraction
of 12Hawk+
1
2Dove for the best response dynamics. The values of (α,αp)
are (5,1), for the example in figure 2, and (3,1) in figure 3.
3.2. Effect of growing population. We consider a situation when the num-
ber of interactions among agents is constant and does not change if the pop-
ulation size N(t) increases. That is, the effective learning rate
αp =
2h
N(t)δ
=
N0
N(t)
2h
N0δ
=
α1
N(t)
,
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FIGURE 1. Phase portraites for best-response (left) and
replicator (right) equations for Hawk-Dove-Retaliator game
in table 1. On the left, three polygonal regions, formed by
lines OL, OM and O(.5H+ .5D) are the regions where the
best response function a single value: H, D, or R. The basin
of attraction for R is polygon KRMO (left) and region above
curve HOD (right). The plots show several trajectories for
the best response and the replication equations.
FIGURE 2. Cultural evolution: reproduction dominating
case. Three subpopulaitons starting at A, B, and C, move
toward Retaliator. A trajectory starting at D is the mean best
response (strategy profile). Notice that it changes discontin-
uously when one of the groups crosses boundaries of best
response polygons.
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FIGURE 3. Cultural evolution: learning dominating case.
Same initial conditions as in Figure 2. All groups converge
to .5H+.5D after the group that started at C moves to the
adjacent polygon. Trajectory starting at D is the mean best
response (strategy profile). Notice that it changes discon-
tinuously (switches to D′) when the top group moves to the
adjacent polygon.
where N0 is the population size at time t = 0. The system of equations is
(25) ∂t f +
α1
N(t)
divp(b¯(t) f ) = α f
(
∑
i j
ai jbi(p)b¯ j(t)−ai jb¯i(t)b¯ j(t)
)
,
(26) ∂tN(t) = αN∑
i j
b¯i(t)b¯ j(t),
with b¯(t) given by (15). Consider rock-paper-scissors game from table 2.
We define the fitness levels (number of offspring) ai j as basis fitness 1 plus
the numbers from the table. The best response function b(p) is sketched in
figure 4, to which we refer below. Initially, the population is split into three
groups. The first is 23/32 of all population and every agent in this groups has
initially learning prior p1(0) = (0.5,0.4,0.1). It is located in the polygon
RNOL for which the best response is to play “paper”. The second group of
proportion 1/4 has prior p2(0) = (0.2,0.7,0.1) with the best response “scis-
sors”, and the third of proportion 1/32 has prior p3(0) = (0.32,0.32,0.36).
The mean best response b¯(0) is located on insider region LONP. Suppose
that initially there are 10 agents and the values of the parameters α1 = 1 and
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α = 0.5. The distribution function f has the form
f (p, t) =
3
∑
i=1
wi(t)δ (p− pi(t)),
3
∑
i=1
wi(t) = 1,
and the system (25), (26) reduces to a system of 5 ODEs forwi(t), pi(t), N(t),
i= 1..3
The dynamics of priors p1(t), p2(t), p3(t), and the mean best response
b¯(t) is shown on figure 4, obtained from solving the system of ODEs numer-
ically. In this dynamics, statistical learning pushes p1, p2, p3 toward b¯(t),
however, the rate of learning decreases exponentially (we show this below),
and as the result p1(t), and p2(t) will asymptotically approach some loca-
tions in the same polygons where they have started, where as p3(t) moves
to the decision polygon of p2(t) and also becomes locked there. Then, the
population frequency vector b¯ converges to “scissors” along line PS, mean-
ing that subpopulations that started in LOMP and MSNO out-evolves the
first group.
The dynamics here is different from that of the replicator equation for
which b¯(t) oscillates on a closed trajectory passing through the initial point
b¯(0). It differs also, from the dynamics of the best-response equation, that
converges to the equilibrium (1/3,1/3,1/3), see Gaunersdorfer and Hof-
bauer [4].
To see that this scenario takes place, notice that as long as b¯(t) is located
on line PS, b¯1(t) = 0 and we compute
∂tN = α(b¯2(t)+ b¯2(t))2N = αN.
Thus, the population grows exponentially, N(t) = N0eαt . In the state of pri-
ors R3+, each group moves to new positions given by formulas
pi(t) = pi(0)+
α1
N0
∫ t
0
e−αt b¯(τ)dτ.
Note, that figure 4 shows projections of this pi(t) onto S2. Clearly, p1(t)
and p2(t) move a finite distance away from their initial position, and the
parameters α,α1,N0 can be selected (as in this example) in such a way that
p1(t) p2(t) remain in the polygon where it has started. Moreover, a small
fraction of population w3 can be placed initially into region OMSN, close
to line ON, so that it crosses that line, forcing b¯(t) to move to line PS.
4. APPENDIX
4.1. Best response function BR(p).. Let Sd−1 be the d− 1 dimensional
simplex
{
p ∈ Rd+ : ∑i pi = 1
}
. Let A= {ai j} represents payoff matrix in a
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Rock Paper Scissors
Rock 0 -1 1
Paper 1 0 -1
Scissors -1 1 0
TABLE 2. Rock-Paper-Scissors game.
FIGURE 4. Cultural evolution with constant interaction fre-
quency. The plot shows three polygonal regions where the
best response function takes a single value: R, P, or S. There
are three subpopulations located at points A,B, and C, re-
spectively. The population starting at C moves to the adja-
cent polygon and stays there for all subsequent times. Sub-
populations started at A and B do not leave their polygons.
A discontinuous trajectory starting in at D is the mean best-
response (strategy profile). Asymptotically it moves to S,
meaning that the subpopulations contained in the polygon
LONP, out-evolves the population from the adjacent poly-
gon LRMO.
symmetric game. We will assume that for no two indexes i 6= j,
(27) ∑
k
aikpk =∑
k
a jkpk, ∀ p ∈ Sd−1.
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Denote by ri(p) = ∑k aikpk, the payoff to strategy i played against mixed
strategy p, and a set
I (p) =
{
i0(p) ∈ 1..d : ri0(p) = maxi ri(p)
}
.
Denote the coordinate vectors ei = (0, ..0,1,0..0), with 1 in ith position, and
a multi-valued function
(28) BR(p) =
{
convex hull of all ei0(p), such that i0(p) ∈I (p)
}
.
Under hypothesis (27), Sd−1 is a union of finite number of polytops such
that BR(p) is single-valued in the interior of each polytop Pk, and at any
point p on the boundary of Pk, the best response BR(p) contains the value
BR(p1) from the interior of Pk :
BR(p1) ∈ BR(p), ∀p1 ∈ Interior(Pk), p ∈ ∂Pk.
This condition can be re-phrased in an equivalent way, as a continuity con-
dition: for any p ∈ Sd−1, there is ε > 0, such that for any ε1 < ε, and any
point p1 ∈ Bε1(p)∩Sd−1,
(29) BR(p1)⊆ BR(p).
Finally, we select a single-valued representative of b(p) from the values
of BR(p). If p ∈ Rd+, then b(p) is one of the values of BR(p/∑i pi). The
selection can be, for example, the barycenter of the set of values of BR(p),
which corresponds to the situation when agents are choosing one strategy
at random (from an uniform distribution).
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